Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1999

Fred K. Stocks and Brenda K. Stocks v. United
States Fidelity and Guaranty Company, and the
Talbert Corporation : Brief of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Gary L. Johnson; Richards, Brandt, Miller & Nelson; Michael L. Deamer; Randle, Deamer, Zarr,
Romrell & Lee; Attorneys for Appellees.
Leslie W. Slaugh; Howard, Lewis & Petersen; Ray G. Martineau; Anthony R. Martineau; Attorneys
for Appellants.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Stocks v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company, No. 990624 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1999).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/2263

This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
FRED K. STOCKS and BRENDA K.
STOCKS,
Plaintiffs - Appellants,

Case No. 990624-CA

vs.
UNITED STATES FIDELITY AND
GUARANTY COMPANY, a Corporation;
and THE TALBERT CORPORATION, a
Corporation,

Oral Argument Priority 15

Defendants - Appellees.
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
UNITED STATES FIDELITY AND GUARANTY COMPANY

ATTORNEYS FOR
PLAINTIFFS/APPELLANTS:
Leslie W. Slaugh
Howard, Lewis & Petersen
120 East 300 North
P.O. Box 1248
Provo, Utah 84603
Telephone: (801) 373-6345

ATTORNEYS FOR
PLAINTIFFS/APPELLANTS;
Ray G. Martineau
Anthony R. Martineau
3098 Highland Drive, Suite 450
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
Telephone: (801) 486-0200

ATTORNEYS FOR
DEFENDANT/APPELLEE USF&G:
Gary L. Johnson
Richards, Brandt, Miller & Nelson
Key Bank Tower, Seventh Floor
50 South Main Street
P.O. Box 2465
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465
Telephone: (801) 531-2000
ATTORNEYS FOR
DEFENDANT/APPELLEE
THE TALBERT CORPORATION:
Michael L. Deamer
Randle, Deamer, Zarr, Romrell & Lee
139 East South Temple, Suite 330s?! i]
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 351-0441

andro
Clark ni ihfi fV»ni+

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
FRED K. STOCKS and BRENDA K.
STOCKS,
Plaintiffs - Appellants,

Case No. 990624-CA

vs.
UNITED STATES FIDELITY AND
GUARANTY COMPANY, a Corporation;
and THE TALBERT CORPORATION, a
Corporation,

Oral Argument Priority 15

Defendants - Appellees.
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
UNITED STATES FIDELITY AND GUARANTY COMPANY

ATTORNEYS FOR
PLAINTD7FS/APPELLANTS;
Leslie W. Slaugh
Howard, Lewis & Petersen
120 East 300 North
P.O. Box 1248
Provo, Utah 84603
Telephone: (801) 373-6345

ATTORNEYS FOR
PLAINTIFFS/APPELLANTS:
Ray G. Martineau
Anthony R. Martineau
3098 Highland Drive, Suite 450
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
Telephone: (801) 486-0200

ATTORNEYS FOR
DEFENDANT/APPELLEE USF&G:
Gary L. Johnson
Richards, Brandt, Miller & Nelson
Key Bank Tower, Seventh Floor
50 South Main Street
P.O. Box 2465
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465
Telephone: (801) 531-2000
ATTORNEYS FOR
DEFENDANT/APPELLEE
THE TALBERT CORPORATION;
Michael L. Deamer
Randle, Deamer, Zarr, Romrell & Lee
139 East South Temple, Suite 330
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 351-0441

TABLE OF CONTENTS
JURISDICTION

1

ISSUES PRESENTED

1

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES

2

STATEMENT OF CASE

2

A.

Nature of the Case

2

B.

Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below

2

C.

Statement of Facts

3

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

6

ARGUMENT

7

POINT I
THE STOCKS HAVE NO STANDING TO RECOVER
THEIR PERSONAL DAMAGES RESULTING FROM FUNDING
THE DEFENSE THAT USF&G REFUSED TO PROVIDE
A.

B.

7

USF&G Owes No Coverage Under Its Contract of Insurance for
Claims Made Against Timber Products and Stocks' Claims are Moot

7

The Stocks Have No Standing as Shareholders to Raise Claims
that are Rightly Those of the Corporation

8

CONCLUSION

16

ADDENDUM A
Amended Counterclaims and Crossclaim of Defendants Paul David Redd, Diane B. Redd
and Paul D. Redd Family Partnership in the case of Timber Products, Inc. v. Paul David
Redd, etal, Civil No. 940700057 (R. 68-88)

i

ADDENDUM B
Ruling on Motion to Intervene and Ruling on Amended Motion for Order Granting Leave
to File and Serve Third Amended Complaint in Timber Products, Inc. v. Paul David
Redd, etal, Civil No. 940700057 (R. 90-95)
ADDENDUM C
Ruling on USF&G's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment in Timber Products, Inc. v
Paul David Redd, etal, Civil No. 940700057 (Decided February 18, 1999)

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
Broadwater v. Old Republic Surety, 854 P.2d 527 (Utah 1993)
DLB Collection Trust v. Harris, 893 P.2d 593 (Utah Ct. App. 1995)

1
8, 9, 10, 11, 16

Del Monte Corp. v. Moore, 580 P.2d 224 (Utah 1978)
Flynn v. Merick, 881 F.2d 446 (7th Cir. 1989)]

6
14, 15

FredK. Stocks and Brenda K. Stocks v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co.
and The Talbert Corp., Civil No. 9707-87

5

Hammes v. AAMCO Transmissions, Inc., 33 F.3d 774 (7th Cir. 1994)

10

Herzingv. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 907 S.W.2d 574 (Tex. Ct. App. 1995)

12, 13

Kush v. American States Insurance Co., 853 F.2d 1380 (7th Cir. 1988)

12

Labovitz v. Washington Times Corp., 172 F.3d 897 (D.C. Cir. 1999)

10

Lui Ciro, Inc. v. Ciro, Inc., 895 F. Supp. 1365 (D. Haw. 1995)

10

Maryland Staffing Services, Inc. v. Manpower, Inc., 936 F. Supp. 1494
(E.D. Wis. 1996)
Mason v. FDIC, 888 F. Supp. 799 (S.D. Tex. 1995)
Nicholson v. Ash, 800 P.2d 1352 (Colo. Ct. App. 1990)
Nome Commercial Co. v. National Bank of Alaska, 948 P.2d 443 (Alaska 1997)
Norman v. Murray First Thrift, 596 P.2d 1028 (Utah 1979)

13, 14
15
9, 10
10
8, 9

Osguthorpe v. Osguthorpe, 872 P.2d 1057 (Utah Ct. App. 1994)

8

Richards v. Baum, 914 P.2d 719 (Utah 1996)

7

iii

S.W. Jordan v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co., etal, 843 F. Supp. 164
(S.D. Miss. 1993)

11, 12, 16

State, Department of Human Services v. Jacoby, 975 P.2d 939
(Utah Ct. App. 1999)

6

Timber Products, Inc. v. Paul David Redd, etal., Civil No. 940700057

2

Universal Underwriters Insurance Co. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins.,
925 P.2d 1270 (Utah Ct. App. 1996)

1

Wilson v. Askew, 709 F. Supp. 146 (W.D. Ark. 1989)

15

STATUTES
Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. § 5.111(a)

16

Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-622

15

Utah Code Ann. § 31A-21-313(1)

6

iv

JURISDICTION
Appellee United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company ( now The St. Paul
Companies, but for ease of reference for the parties and the Court of Appeals, hereinafter
"USF&G"), adopts by reference Appellants' jurisdictional statement.
ISSUES PRESENTED
1.

Does an insurer who has obtained summary judgment in its favor that it owes

no duty to defend a corporation under a liability policy, face exposure to sole shareholders of that
corporation, who are also named insureds under the same policy, or is their claim moot?
2.

Do shareholders of a corporation that has been denied coverage by an insurer

under a liability policy have a separate non-derivative claim against the insurer for monies expended
for defense of the corporation and for related consequential danger?
These cases were decided by summary judgment, and the issue of right to summary
judgment is a question of law reviewed for correctness with no deference to the trial court's legal
conclusions. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. v. State Farm Mut Auto Ins., 925 P.2d 1270, 1273
(Utah Ct. App. 1996). Facts and inferences to be drawn therefrom are viewed in light most favorable
to the party opposing summary judgment. Broadwater v. Old Republic Sun, 854 P.2d 527 (Utah
1993). The issues raised by USF&G (with the exception of the mootness issue relating to USF&G
having received summary judgment in its favor on the coverage issue, which was decided after the
briefing on the motions below) were raised and argued in USF&G's Memorandum in support of its
Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative for Summary Judgment (R. 20-95) and were raised and
argued in USF&G's Reply Memorandum (R. 398-404).

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
Appellee does not contend that there is any statute that is determinative of the issues
on appeal in this matter.
STATEMENT OF CASE
A.

Nature of the Case.
This is an appeal from afinaljudgment in a civil action.

B.

Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below.
The Stocks filed a Verified Complaint on December 12, 1997. (R. 1-12.) On

January 30, 1998, USF&G filed a Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, Motion for Summary
Judgment asserting three grounds for dismissal: (1) that Fred and Brenda Stocks, as individual
shareholders, did not have the right to sue USF&G for wrongs allegedly done to their corporation;
(2) that the exact issue had already been determined by the Court in the case of Timber Products, Inc.
v. Paul David Redd, etaly Civil No. 940700057 CR (Seventh Judicial District Court in and for San
Juan County, State of Utah); and (3) that the claim had been brought in violation of the applicable
statute of limitations. (R. 20-21.) Talbert alsofileda Motion to Dismiss, asserting (1) statute of
limitations; (2) lack of standing of individual shareholders to bring claims that rightly belong with the
corporation; and (3) waiver and estoppel. (R. 96-97.)
Oral argument on the Motions was held August 19,1998. (R. 408.) On February 22,
1999, the Court issued a written ruling determining that the prior Order of the Court in the Timber
Products case was not afinaljudgment sufficient to invoke res judicata but found that with respect
2

to the Stocks, no action had been filed against them personally by anyone, and neither USF&G nor
Talbert had been asked to provide a defense or indemnity to the Stocks and, therefore, they face no
exposure in their claims, including the claims for emotional distress, which were entirely derivative
of the claims made against TPI. The Court further found that their injuries were not separate and
distinct from those suffered by the corporation and, therefore, they lacked standing in their individual
capacities to bring the suit. (R. 408-10.) Formal Orders granting the Motions were entered on
June 16, 1999. (R. 412-14, 415-19.)
G

Statement of Facts.
The following facts are undisputed.
Fred and Brenda Stocks are officers and principle shareholders of a Utah corporation

known as Timber Products, Inc. ("TPI")

(R. 1-2, ffif 1-2.) In 1992, Paul David Redd and other

members of his family entered into a timber harvesting contract with TPI. (R. 142, ^ 8.)
On June 14, 1994, TPI was insured by USF&G under a master insurance contract,
policy number 1MP30088353900, with a policy period from June 30, 1993 to June30, 1994. (R. 3.)
On June 14, 1994, a forest fire ("forest fire") occurred on certain timber lands owned by the Redd
family ("Redds") from which TPI was then harvesting timber. (R. 5, If 11.)
The forest fire was claimed by the Redds and by San Juan County to have been
negligently started by an employee of an independent logging contractor who was harvesting timber
for TPI from the lands owned by the Redds. (R. 5, ^ 12.) TPI requested both defense and indemnity
from USF&G under the insurance contract because of the claims made by the Redds and San Juan
3

County. On or about July 12, 1994, USF&G denied coverage for the claims made against TPI by the
Redds and San Juan County. (R. 24, % 6.)
In December of 1994, TPI filed a Complaint for declaratory relief against the Redds,
USF&G, Talbert, Don Applegate Construction, Kelling Insurance Agency and Northfield Insurance
Company. The case is venued in the Seventh Judicial District Court in and for San Juan County,
State of Utah, Civil No. 94070057 CV (hereinafter the "Original Action"). (R. 24, U 8.)
In March of 1995, TPI filed a Second Amended Complaint in the Original Action.
The Redd Defendants filed amended counterclaims and cross-claims. The amended counterclaims
do not plead any causes of action against the Stocks, but allege claims only against TPI. The
cross-claim was against Applegate, only. (R. 24, ^ 9; R. 68-88; see Addendum at A.)
On December 9,1996, TPI filed a Motion to Intervene as Parties Plaintiff and Motion
for Order Granting Leave to File and Serve a Third Amended Complaint seeking to add the Stocks
individually as Plaintiffs in the Original Action. USF&G, Talbert, Northfield and other Defendants
opposed this Motion arguing that it was both untimely and that the Stocks, as individual shareholders
of TPI, could not bring a suit in their capacity as individual shareholders for an alleged wrong done
by a third party to the corporation. (R. 25, U 10; see Addendum at B.)
On July 14, 1997, the trial court entered an Order denying Plaintiffs Motion to
Intervene and Motion for Order Granting Leave to File and Serve a Third Amended Complaint. The
Court denied the Motions for two reasons: the first being that the Motions were untimely. The
second reason, however, was that the Court was persuaded that the law in Utah is that a shareholder
4

of a corporation may not bring a suit in his or her individual capacity as a shareholder for the wrong
done to the corporation by a third person. The Court determined that the claims by the Stocks fit
within the perimeters of that maxim of Utah law. (R. 25; R. 90-94.)
TPIfiledan interlocutory appeal of the Court's ruling, but that was denied by the Utah
Supreme Court. On December 12, 1997, the verified Complaint was filed in the action of FredK.
Stocks andBrenda K. Stocks v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co. and The Talbert Corp.,
Civil No. 9707-87, in the Seventh Judicial District Court of San Juan County, State of Utah. (R. 25,
U 12; R. 1-12.)
As noted above, USF&G and Talbert filed Motions to dismiss and/or for summary
judgment and, on February 22, 1999, the trial court issued a written ruling granting the Defendants'
Motions and dismissing the verified Complaint. In the Original Action, TPI and USF&G had filed
cross-motions for summary judgment on the enforceability of afiredamage exclusion in the USF&G
contract of insurance. On February 18,1999, the trial court issued a ruling on USF&G's Motion for
Partial Summary Judgmentfindingthat the exclusion was unambiguous and enforceable and excluded
coverage for property damage due to the forestfirethat occurred in June of 1994. The Court found
that USF&G had no duty to defend TPI with respect to the claims that arose out of the forest fire.
(See Addendum at C.)

5

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Regardless of whether an individual shareholder has standing to pursue claims against
an insurer that has denied coverage to the corporation for claims made by third parties against the
corporation, when a court rules that the insurer has no duty to defend the corporation, the individual
shareholders become moot. Further, in this case, the claims of the Stocks against USF&G are entirely
derivative of the claims of the corporation. Utah law provides that shareholders of a corporation may
not bring suit in their individual capacity for a wrong done by a third party to the corporation, unless
the wrong itself amounts to a violation of a duty arising from a contract or otherwise and owed
directly to the shareholder. The Stocks were never sued and never attempted to individually invoke
a duty to defend under the insurance contract.1

*At the trial court level, USF&G had argued that the applicable statute of limitations, Utah
Code Ann. § 31A-21-313(1), as written and enacted when the Stocks' alleged cause of action against
USF&G would have accrued, provided that an action on a written policy or contract of insurance
must be commenced "within 3 years after the inception of the loss." The inception of the loss was
the point in time when the Stocks had to pay monies out in defense of TPI, and they would have had
to have filed their claims by July of 1997 in order to meet that statute of limitations. At the end of
April of 1996, however, the Utah legislature amended § 31 A-21-313(1) to apply to only "first party
contracts." USF&G argued at the trial court level that the Stocks could not rely upon the extension
of the statute of limitations and were bound by the statute of limitations in effect at the time their
cause of action arose.
In conducting additional research for this brief, however, USF&G came across the case ofDel Monte
Corp. v. Moore, 580 P.2d 224, 225 (Utah 1978) in which the Utah Supreme Court allowed the
extension of the statutory period of limitation because the original cause of action was still alive when
the statute of limitations was amended. This Court reaffirmed that proposition in State, Dept of
Human Services v. Jacoby, 975 P.2d 939, 943 (Utah Ct. App. 1999). Based upon the rulings in Del
Monte Corp. and Jacoby, USF&G withdraws its argument that the Stocks' claim is barred by the
applicable statute of limitations.
6

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE STOCKS HAVE NO STANDING TO RECOVER
THEIR PERSONAL DAMAGES RESULTING FROM FUNDING
THE DEFENSE THAT USF&G REFUSED TO PROVIDE.
A.

USF&G Owes No Coverage Under Its Contract of Insurance for Claims Made
Against Timber Products and Stocks' Claims are Moot
In Utah, the strong judicial policy against giving advisory opinions dictates that

appellate court refrain from adjudicating moot questions. Richards v. Baum, 914 P.2d 719, 720
(Utah 1996). Despite this strong public policy, the Stocks bring this appeal asserting that they have
individual claims against USF&G for the costs they have incurred in defending TPI from claims
arising out of the forest fire.
Stocks have filed this appeal to pursue those claims - without disclosing to this Court
that the trial court in the Original Action (which is the same judge in the same district as heard this
action) had granted partial summary judgment to USF&G and found that USF&G had no duty to
defend TPI from these exact claims. Indeed, despite knowing of the trial court's ruling, in their
opening brief the Stocks allude to evidence being presented that USF&G's denial of coverage "was
made in bad faith,...." (Appellants' Brief at p. 6.)
If USF&G has no duty to defend the corporation that entered into the timber
harvesting contract with the Redds and that was sued by the Redds in San Juan County, it certainly
has no duty to reimburse individual shareholders ofthe corporation who have advanced and/or loaned

7

monies to the corporation to defend those claims. This Court need go no further in its analysis and
should dismiss this appeal as moot.2
!$•

The Stocks Have No Standing as Shareholders to Raise Claims that are Rightly
Those of the Corporation,
Should this Honorable Court determine that the Stocks' appeal with respect to

USF&G should not be dismissed as moot, then this Court should affirm the trial court below because
the Stocks seek, as individual shareholders, to sue USF&G for wrongs allegedly done to their
corporation, TPI. Specifically, the Stocks allege that the denial by USF&G of defense and indemnity
with respect to the claims brought against TPI by the Redds and San Juan County required the Stocks
"to finance Timber Products in defending itself from the claims." (Appellants' Brief at p. 6.) The
Stocks also claim to have suffered emotional distress as a result of USF&G's action.
Utah law provides that shareholders of a corporation may not bring suit in their
individual capacity for a wrong done by a third party to the corporation. Norman v. Murray First
Thrift, 596 P.2d 1028, 1031-32 (Utah 1979); DLB Collection Trust v. Harris, 893 P.2d 593, 596
(Utah Ct App. 1995). In Norman, the Utah Supreme Court held that a sole shareholder of a
corporation was not the real party in interest in a lawsuit for claims of improper disposition of
collateral when the title to the collateral was in the name of the corporation and the loan agreement

2

It should be noted, however, that this Court has determined that whether to consider a
mooted controversy is a matter of judicial policy, not law. Osguthorpe v. Osguthorpe,
872 P.2d 1057, 1058 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
8

for which the collateral was placed was executed in the name of the corporation. Norman, 596 P.2d
at 1031-32.
The general rule regarding shareholder's capacity to bring an individual suit has an
exception to it which provides that a shareholder may "bring an individual cause of action if the harm
to the corporation also damaged the shareholder as an individual rather than a shareholder." DLB
Collection Trust, 893 P.2d at 596 (emphasis in original). This exception does not arise, however,
merely because the acts complained of damage both the corporation and the shareholder. Rather, the
exception is confined to cases in which the wrong itself amounts to "violation of a duty arising from
a contract or otherwise, and owed directly to the shareholder" personally. Id.
In DLB Collection Trust, the Utah Court of Appeals analyzed the issue of whether an
individual shareholder guaranteeing a loan was sufficient to invoke the exception and confer standing
on the shareholder to bring an individual action against a third party who had allegedly wronged the
corporation.

In analyzing that claim, this Court examined the case of Nicholson v. Ash,

800 P.2d 1352 (Colo. Ct. App. 1990), and made the following observation:
The court delineated several reasons why a stockholder, who
was also a guarantor of corporate debt, is precluded from asserting a
personal right of action against a third party whose actions have
resulted in damage to the corporation. Namely, it is the corporation
that has suffered direct injury, and any damage resulting to the
stockholder is merely indirect; requiring the claim to be pursued on
behalf of the corporation prevents multiplicity of suits by various

9

stockholders; and any proceeds from the litigation will be treated as
corporate assets and will be available to satisfy both creditors and
other stockholders' claims. Nicholson, 800 P.2d at 1356.
893 P.2d at 597.
This Court adopted the reasoning in Nicholson and affirmed the trial court's decision
that the individual shareholder in DLB Collection Trust had not suffered a loss that was unique - over
claims of other shareholders - and did not create a duty owed to the shareholder personally. This is
the general rule across the United States.

See, e.g., Labovitz v. Washington Times Corp.,

172 F.3d 897, 900-903 (D.C Cir. 1999) (shareholders can bring an individual claim if they suffer
injuries directly or independently of the corporation; claims based on injury to the corporation,
however, are derivative in nature and any damages suffered are owed to the corporation; to determine
whether claims are individual or derivative, courts must look to the nature of the wrongs alleged in
the body of the complaint, not to the plaintiffs' designation or stated intention); Hammes v. AAMCO
Transmissions, Inc., 33 F.3d 774, 777 (7th Cir. 1994) ("shareholders do not have standing to sue for
harms to the corporation, or even for the derivative harm to themselves that might arise from a tort
or other wrong to the corporation.").3

3

See also, Lui Ciro, Inc. v. Ciro, Inc., 895 F.Supp. 1365, 1380-81 (D. Haw. 1995)
(guarantors of corporation's debt, even if those guarantors are also stockholders, do not have
standing to bring action if only harm suffered is derivative of harm corporation suffered); Nome
Commercial Co. v. Nat 'I Bank of Alaska, 948 P.2d 443,452-53 (Alaska 1997) (fact that shareholders
had to lend corporation money as a result of allegedly improper action by bank did not entitled
individual shareholders to damages because they did not suffer damages that could not be recovered
in an action by the corporation).
10

The principles of law discussed above are dispositive of the Stocks' claims against
USF&G in this case. The counterclaims by the Redd Defendants and the claims by San Juan County
were against TPI only. Neither Fred nor Brenda Stocks are named as defendants in any action. Like
the shareholders in DLB Collection Trust, the Stocks' status as sole shareholders and guarantor of
Timber Products does not enhance their status over and above shareholder status, nor does it create
a duty which USF&G owes to the Stocks personally, even though they also are named insureds along
with TPI under the USF&G contract of insurance.
InS.W. Jordan v. UnitedStates Fidelity andGuaranty Co., etal, 843 F.Supp. 164
(S.D. Miss. 1993), an insured electrical contractor corporation and the contractor's principal
("S.W. Jordan") brought an action against USF&G and Fidelity and Guaranty Insurance Company
("FGIC"), alleging bad faith failure to settle a claim. In analyzing whether S.W. Jordan had a
personal cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, the court noted that in
Mississippi, an action to redress injuries to a corporation, whether arising in contract or in tort,
cannot be maintained by a stockholder in his or her own name, but must be brought by the
corporation because the action belongs to the corporation and not the individual stockholder even
though the complaining stockholder owns all or substantially all of the stock of the corporation.
843 F.Supp. at 175. The court also noted that there was an exception to this rule under Mississippi
law that arises where the stockholder seeks damage for the violation of a duty owed directly to the
stockholder. Id. In finding that the exception had no application to the facts of the case, the court
ruled:
11

Though S.W. Jordan was a named insured under the FGIC
policy, this suit does not involve the breach of duty owing to
S.W. Jordan as an insured. Rather, the claims in this action concerned
alleged breaches of duties owed to the corporation and seek to redress
a wrong allegedly done solely to the corporation. And there is
nothing to indicate that S.W. Jordan had any potential individual
exposure. Under these circumstances, S.W. Jordan lacks standing to
sue.
Id. See also, Kush v. American States Ins, Co,, 853 F.2d 1380 (7th Cir. 1988) (sole shareholder of
insured corporation had no claim against liability insurer for intentional infliction of emotional distress
allegedly arising out of insurer's handling of corporation's claims; shareholder was not policyholder
or beneficiary of policy).
The Stocks allege that they have suffered emotional distress because they have
individually had to loan monies to the corporation and have somehow suffered some sort of individual
harm as a result of claims brought against the corporation. That simply is not sufficient to allow them
to bring their own, individual actions.
In Herzing v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 907 S.W.2d 574 (Tex. Ct. App. 1995),
corporations and individuals brought actions against the life insurer seeking damages for the insurer's
agent's allegedly fraudulent activities in procuring loans for the corporations. For example, Mary
Lindsay owned Multi-Communications, Inc., a dormant corporation. She and her husband were
trying to locate funding for the corporation to establish a cable TV system and other projects. They
began discussions with the insurer's agent, and he represented that he could obtain a self-liquidating
$55 million loan with Metropolitan Life, but he would require a $75,000.00 up-front brokerage fee

12

to consummate the loan and the purchase of a $500,000.00 annuity on each of them. The Lindsays
paid the brokerage fee and purchased the annuities, but no loan was obtained and the up-front money
was not refunded. 907 S.W.2d at 577.
The Lindsays, the Titlows and other individuals who had paid money out of their own
pockets on behalf of their corporations sought to make a recovery for mental anguish. The Texas
Court of Appeals noted there was no disagreement between the parties that a corporate stockholder
does not have a derivative action where the wrong has been committed only against a corporation
and that there was an exception that a stockholder may have a cause of action against a third party
where there is a direct injury to the stockholder in the stockholder's individual capacity and such
claim is independent of any duty owed to the corporation. The Texas Court of Appeals found that
the Lindsays and others had no standing to bring their individual claims:
We hold that the trial court properly excluded evidence of
mental anguish suffered by the Lindsays and Titlows. Their actions as
stockholders were solely to obtain a corporate loan. The loss suffered
by the corporations in not obtaining the loan was the corporation's
loss; those losses did not give rise to a stockholder's derivative action
nor a personal action by the Lindsays and Titlows.
Id. at 584.
The Stocks' claims of emotional distress as a result of the denial of coverage to TPI
must fail also. In Maryland Staffing Services, Inc. v. Manpower, Inc., 936 F.Supp. 1494 (E.D. Wis.
1996), a franchisee and its individual owners brought suit against the franchisor alleging that the
franchisor had overcharged it for workers compensation and liability insurance. Defendants moved
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to dismiss the claims of the individual plaintiffs, John and Nancy Schandonnet (the "Schandonnets"),
who were the owners and officers of Maryland Staffing, on the ground they lacked the standing to
pursue the claims.
The court began its analysis by enunciating the general principle that a corporate
shareholder does not have an individual right of action against third persons for damages to the
shareholder resulting indirectly from injury to the corporation. The court recognized the exception
to the general rule such as where a contractual duty exists between the wrongdoer and the
shareholder or where the shareholder suffers an injury separate and distinct from that suffered by
other shareholders. The court noted that the Schandonnets asserted that they had suffered numerous
injuries independent from those suffered by the corporation, including personal pain, suffering,
humiliation, emotional distress and mental anguish. 936 F.Supp. at 1498-99.
The court rejected the plaintiffs' characterization of the claims and concluded: "that
the injuries suffered by the individual plaintiffs are not separate and distinct from those suffered by
the corporation." Id. at 1499. The court held that the alleged injuries that plaintiff had suffered were
derivative of the injuries to Maryland Staffing because "the individual plaintiff suffered mental and
physical injuries as a result of the financial damages incurred by the corporation." The court held:
Obviously investors in afirmsuffer when the firm incurs a loss,
"yet only the firm may vindicate the rights at issue."... (citations
omitted). As was the case in Flynn /v. Merick, 881 F.2d 446 (7* Cir.
1989)], here "[i]t is clear that the alleged injury is an injury to the
corporation - an injury to the shareholders was an indirect result of
the damage done to the corporation and as such, it does not create the
necessary direct and independent harm required to maintain
14

shareholder standing." Flynn, 881 F.2d at 449. Maryland Staffing is
the only party authorized to vindicate its rights vis-a-vis Manpower.
Id. at 1499.
It was only TPI that was sued as a result of the forest fire, and it was only TPI that
had been denied coverage for the claims brought against TPI. It was only TPI that had the right to
seek any available redress from USF&G.4 The claims of the Stocks individually are based on the
alleged wrongs done to TPI, and the trial court's dismissal should be affirmed.
The cases cited by the Stocks in their brief do not contravene the analysis set forth
above. For example, in Wilson v. Askew, 709 F.Supp. 146 (W.D. Ark. 1989), a fifty percent
shareholder in a Venezuelan corporation invested %VA million in the corporation.

The other

shareholders diverted the profits in the corporation, and the plaintiff sued alleging racketeering and
fraud claims. The court found that the plaintiff had stated an individual injury - loss of the initial
investment as opposed to the right to share in the profits - and not a corporate one and had standing
to bring this suit against the other shareholders. The possible application of a shareholder's derivative
action has nothing to do with this Court's analysis of the Stocks' assertion that they are entitled to
bring their own bad faith claims against USF&G.
Similarly, the case of Mason v. FDIC, 888 F.Supp. 799 (S.D. Tex. 1995), is also of
no aid to this Court in analyzing the issues before it. Mason involved a shareholder of a corporation

4

Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-622 provides that "shareholders" as such, are not liable to the
corporation's creditors nor are they personally liable for the debts of the corporation.
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that had purchased a radio station financed by a line of credit and loan from a bank, and who had
brought his suit against the FDIC, as a receiver of the bank, under various Texas statutory provisions.
For example, the court found that the plaintiff had individual standing to bring a breach of warranty
claim concerning the loan agreement between the bank and the corporation because the plaintiff was
a "interested party" under Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. §5.111(a). Such reasoning is not relevant
or helpful to this Court in determining whether the Stocks have an individual right to bring a bad faith
claim against USF&G because, as shareholders, they had to pay the defense costs incurred by TPI
as a result of the fire claim. DLB Collection Trust, S. W. Jordan and the other cases advanced in this
brief are controlling and dispositive.

CONCLUSION
Because in the Original Action the trial court has granted USF&G summary judgment
that it has no duty to defend TPI, it has no duty to reimburse the Stocks for defense costs and their
claim is moot. Further, the Stocks have no standing individually to bring claims for the bad faith
denial of coverage to the corporation, because their claims are solely derivative of harm suffered by
the corporation.
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This Court should affirm the trial court's dismissal of Plaintiffs' Complaint.
DATED this <J^

day of December, 1999.
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER
& NELSON

GARY^ JOHNSON
Attorneys for Defendant and Appellee
USF&G
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Anthony R. Martineau, Esq.
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ATTACHMENT A

Amended Counterclaims and Cross Claim of
Defendants Paul David Redd, Diane B. Redd, and Paul D. Redd Family Partnership

Timber Products, Inc. v. Paul David Redd, etal.
Civil No. 940700057
(R. 68-88)

'X

MICHAEL R. JENSEN (#1685)
Keller, Jensen & Bunnell
90 West 100 North
Price, Utah 84501
Telephone: (801) 637-1245
GREGORY K. HOSKIN (CO #424)
MATTHEW G. WEBER (CO #18615)
Hoskin, Farina, Aldrich & Kampf
Professional Corporation
Post Office Box 40
Grand Junction, Colorado 81502
Telephone: (970) 242-4903
Attorneys for Defendants Paul David Redd;
Diane B. Redd; Paul D. Redd Family Partnership
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SAN JUAN COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
TIMBER PRODUCTS, INC,
a Corporation,
Plaintiff,

AMENDED COUNTERCLAIMS AND
CROSS CLAIM OF DEFENDANTS
PAUL DAVID REDD, DIANE B.
REDD, AND PAUL D. REDD
FAMILY PARTNERSHIP

vs
PAUL DAVID REDD; DIANE B. REDD;
PAUL D. REDD FAMILY PARTNERSHIP,
a Limited Partnership;
UNITED STATES FIDELITY AND
GUARANTY COMPANY, a Corporation;
THE TALBERT CORPORATION,
a Corporation; DON APPLEGATE dba
DON APPLEGATE CONSTRUCTION,
KATHALYN S. KELLING and
MITCHELL K. KELLING,
a Co-Partnership or Joint Venture
dba KELLING INSURANCE AGENCY; and
NORTHFIELD INSURANCE COMPANY,
a Corporation,
Defendants.

Civil No. 9407-57
(Judge Bryce K. Bryner)

Defendants Paul David Redd, Diane B. Redd, and Paul D. Redd
Family

Partnership

(Redd

Defendants),

by

and

through

their

attorneys, Keller, Jensen & Bunnell, and Hoskin, Farina, Aldrich &
Kampf, Professional Corporation, counterclaim and cross claim as
follows:
COUNTERCLAIMS
Factual Allegations
1.

The Redd Defendants entered into a contract with Timber

Products, Inc. (Timber Products) effective as of March 12, 1992,
which permitted Timber Products to timber certain forest land owned
by the Redd Defendants (Property) under terms beneficial to both
Timber Products and the Redd Defendants.

See Agreement for Timber

Stand Improvement and for Sale of Timber (Agreement), a copy of
which is attached as Exhibit AA to the Verified Complaint filed
herein.
2.

The Property owned by the Redd Defendants is described in

the Financing Statements incorporated herein and attached hereto as
Exhibits 1 and 2 (Financing Statements).
3.
the

The Redd Defendants at all relevant times have performed

stipulations,

conditions,

and

agreements

stated

in

the

Agreement to be oerformed on their part at the time and in the
manner specified.
4.

The Agreement provides, inter alia:

2

6.
Purchaser shall conduct all operations
on the Property in a workmanlike manner and in
accordance with good practices. . . .
7.
Purchaser shall save harmless and fully
indemnify Seller, his agents and employees
against any and all liability, loss, or damage of
every kind and nature, including attorney's fees,
arising from any act by, omission of, or
negligence of Purchaser or its subcontractors, or
the officers, agents or employees of either,
while conducting operations in accordance with
this Agreement or while on or about the Property,
or arising from any debt, expense or claim
incurred by the Purchaser or its subcontractors,
or the officers, agents or employees of either
8.
Purchaser shall secure and maintain at
all times while conducting operations under this
Agreement, liability insurance covering all such
operations by or on behalf of the Purchaser
issued by a company or companies acceptable to
Seller, with total aggregate policy limits not
less than $2,000,000 and individual occurrence
limits of not less than $1,000,000.
Purchaser
shall
furnish
to
Seller,
prior
to
the
commencement of operations hereunder and as long
thereafter
as
such
operations
continue,
certificates of the issuing insurance company or
companies evidencing that the above required
insurance is in force and effect and agreeing
that said insurance will not be cancelled without
having given at least 10 days advance written
notice to Seller.
10. Purchaser, in conducting all of its
operations pursuant to this Agreement, shall
comply with all applicable laws and regulations
of the state in which the operations are
conducted and of the United States of America
and, without in any way limiting the foregoing,
shall specifically comply with all laws and
regulations
pertaining
to
air
and
water
pollution.
Purchaser shall indemnify and hold
Seller harmless from any and all liability,
including
attorney's
fees,
occasioned
by
3

Purchaser's failure to comply with the laws and
regulations referred to in this paragraph.
18. Purchaser and its subcontractors, and
the agents and employees of each, shall take all
reasonable precautions to prevent the origin and
spread of fire on the Property and shall take
immediate and independent action to suppress all
fires on the Property.
21. . . . In the event of a fire
established to have been caused by the operations
of Purchaser hereunder which destroys Ponderosa
Pine timber on the Property which Purchaser is
obligated to purchase hereunder, Purchaser shall
be obligated to pay Seller for that Ponderosa
Pine timber destroyed the purchase price provided
herein.
In the event of a fire caused by the
operation of Purchaser hereunder which destroys
timber which Purchaser does not have the right to
purchase hereunder, Purchaser will pay Seller the
value of such timber destroyed.
23. In the event that Purchaser defaults in
any of the provisions of this Agreement to be
performed by Purchaser, Seller may, at its
option,
give written
notice
to
Purchaser
specifying the default.
If the default is not
corrected, or if good faith efforts to correct
the default have not been commenced within sixty
(60) days after the receipt of the notice of
default by Purchaser, this Agreement shall
terminate and Purchaser shall have no further
rights hereunder. In that event, all monies paid
by Purchaser to Seller may be retained by Seller
as liquidated damages for the nonperformance of
this Agreement.
26. In any suit or action brought upon or
arising out of this Agreement, and upon any
appeal thereof, the losing party agrees to pay
the prevailing party's reasonable attorney's fees
to be fixed by the trial and appellate courts
respectively.
5.

The Agreement also provides the Redd Defendants with a

security interest in the timber that is subject to sale pursuant to
4

the Agreement,
perfected.
6.

See Agreement at 1 4.

See Financing Statements.
After

entering

Defendants, Timber
contract

with

into

Products

defendant

Construction (Applegate).
7.

That interest has been

the

Agreement

allegedly

Don

entered

Applegate

d/b/a

with
into
Don

the
a

Redd

logging

Applegate

See Complaint at U 18.

Applegate proceeded to commence timbering the Property as

Timber Products1 subcontractor.
8.

Gary Duane Squires (Squires) is an officer, agent, or

employee of Timber Products or its subcontractor, Applegate.
9.

On June 14, 1994, Squires started a forest fire that

destroyed or damaged approximately 1363 acres of timber owned by
the Redd Defendants.
10.

On June 14, 1994, the weather conditions on the Property

were hot and dry.
11.

Upon information and belief, Squires started the fire by

re-filling his leaky chain saw with oil and gas on a downed tree.
The spark arrester had been removed from the saw.
12.

Squires pled guilty to Causing a Catastrophe and was

sentenced by the Seventh Judicial District Court on November 21,
1994.
13.
Products1

At a meeting held on or about June 23, 1994, Timber
president

Fred Stocks

and his wife, Brenda Stocks,

provided Paul Redd with a cover sheet of insurance policy No.
5

1MP30088353900 from United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company
(USF&G Policy) that allegedly covered Timber Products for the fire
damage

and

a

cover

sheet

from

Northfield

Insurance

Company

(Northfield) that allegedly covered Applegate for the fire damage,
14.

USF&G denies coverage on Timber Products' claim against

it arising out of the June 14, 1994 fire. The Redd Defendants were
notified by USF&G of this denial by letter dated October 28, 1994.
15.

USF&G denies coverage in part based upon Form CG22541185,

titled "Exclusion —

Logging and Lumbering Operations" (Logging

Exclusion), which is part of the USF&G Policy.
16.

Even if the Logging Exclusion does not bar coverage, the

USF&G Policy declaration page contains a fire damage limit of
$50,000.
17.

Northfield also denies coverage on Timber Products' claim

arising out of the June 14, 1994 fire.
18.

Upon discovering that Timber Products had not maintained

insurance as required by the Agreement, and after communicating
with

representatives

of Timber

Products, the

declared Timber Products in default.

Redd

Defendants

See Letter from Gregory

Hoskin to Fred Stocks dated December 9, 1994 (Default Letter), a
copy of which is attached to the Verified Complaint as Exhibit CC.
The Default Letter was hand delivered to Timber Products by Paul
Redd on December 13, 1994.
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19.

In the Default Letter, the Redd Defendants listed Timber

Products' obligations under the Agreement, including its obligation
to pay for the Redd Defendants1 losses caused by the fire.

The

Redd Defendants demanded assurance of Timber Products1 performance
by demanding reimbursement of $1.6 million in losses.

The Redd

Defendants explained that failure to pay the losses within the 60day period provided by the Agreement would result in termination of
the Agreement.
20.

The 60-day period expired on February 11, 1995.

21.

Timber Products failed to cure its default or commence

good faith efforts to correct its default within the 60-day period.
22.

Based upon initial expert analysis of aerial photographs

taken of the area burned by the June 14, 1994 fire, damage to the
Redd Defendants due to the fire is now estimated at approximately
$3.8 million.
FIRST COUNTERCLAIM
[Declaratory Judgment —
23.

The Redd Defendants

Timber Products' Default]
adopt and reallege paragraphs 1

through 22 of the Counterclaim Factual Allegations as if set forth
in full here.
24.

There is now existing between Timber Products and the

Redd Defendants an actual, justiciable controversy in which the
Redd Defendants are entitled to have a declaration of their rights

7

and further relief, due to the facts, conditions, and circumstances
as set forth herein.
25.

The Redd Defendants therefore seek declaratory relief

pursuant to title 78, chapter 33, Utah Code Ann., adjudging that
Timber Products defaulted on its obligations under the Agreement
and that the Redd Defendants lawfully terminated the Agreement on
February 11, 1995.
SECOND COUNTERCLAIM
[Declaratory Judgment —
26.

Material Breach by Timber Products]

The Redd Defendants adopt and reallege paragraphs 1

through 22 of the Counterclaim Factual Allegations as if set forth
in full here.
27.

There is now existing between Timber Products and the

Redd Defendants an actual, justiciable controversy in which the
Redd Defendants are entitled to have a declaration of their rights
and further relief, due to the facts, conditions, and circumstances
as set forth herein.
28.

The Redd Defendants therefore seek declaratory relief

pursuant to title 78, chapter 33, Utah Code Ann., adjudging that
Timber

Products

materially

and

substantially

breached

the

Agreement, thereby terminating it and entitling the Redd Defendants
to damages.
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THIRD COUNTERCLAIM
[Declaratory Judgment —
29.

Security Interest]

The Redd Defendants adopt and

reallege paragraphs 1

through 22 of the Counterclaim Factual Allegations as if set forth
in full here.
30.

There is now existing between Timber Products and the

Redd Defendants an actual, justiciable controversy in which the
Redd Defendants are entitled to have a declaration of their rights
and further relief/ due to the facts, conditions, and circumstances
as set forth herein.
31.

The Redd Defendants therefore seek declaratory relief

pursuant to title 78, chapter 33, Utah Code Ann., adjudging that
the Redd Defendants may

lawfully

foreclose on their

security

interest in the timber that is secured by the Agreement and the
Financing Statements.
FOURTH COUNTERCLAIM
[Declaratory Judgment — Termination Based Upon
Timber Products' Failure to Provide Adequate Assurance]
32.

The Redd Defendants adopt and reallege paragraphs 1

through 22 of the Counterclaim Factual Allegations as if set forth
in full here.
33.

There is now existing between Timber Products and the

Redd Defendants an actual judiciable controversy in which the Redd
Defendants are entitled to have a declaration of their rights and
9

further relief, due to the facts, conditions, and circumstances as
set forth herein.
34.

The Agreement is, at least in part, a contract for the

sale of goods pursuant to section 70A-2-107(2), Utah Code Ann.
35.

The Redd Defendants therefore seek declaratory relief

pursuant to title 78, chapter 33, Utah Code Ann., adjudging that
Timber Products repudiated the Agreement pursuant to section 70A-2609, Utah Code Ann., by failing to provide adequate assurance of
its ability to perform its obligations after receiving the Default
Letter.
FIFTH COUNTERCLAIM
[Declaratory Judgment — Redd Defendants1
Right To Take Possession of Collateral]
36.

The Redd Defendants adopt and reallege paragraphs 1

through 22 of the Counterclaim Factual Allegations as if set forth
in full here.
37.

There is now existing between Timber Products and the

Redd Defendants an actual judiciable controversy in which the Redd
Defendants are entitled to have a declaration of their rights and
further relief, due to the facts, conditions, and circumstances as
set forth herein.
38.

The Redd Defendants therefore seek declaratory relief

pursuant to title 78, chapter 33, Utah Code Ann., adjudging that
Timber Products is in default of the Agreement, thereby entitling
10

the Redd Defendants to take possession of the collateral secured by
the Agreement and the Financing Statements pursuant to section
70A-9-503, Utah Code Ann.
SIXTH COUNTERCLAIM
[Declaratory Judgment — Redd Defendants1
Right To Dispose of Collateral]
39.

The Redd Defendants

adopt and reallege paragraphs 1

through 22 of the Counterclaim Factual Allegations as if set forth
in full here.
40.

There is now existing between Timber Products and the

Redd Defendants an actual judiciable controversy in which the Redd
Defendants are entitled to have a declaration of their rights and
further relief, due to the facts, conditions, and circumstances as
set forth herein.
41.

The Redd Defendants therefore seek declaratory relief

pursuant to title 78, chapter 33, Utah Code Ann., adjudging that
Timber Products is in default and the Redd Defendants have the
right to dispose of the collateral secured by the Agreement and
Financing Statements, pursuant to section 70A-9-504, Utah Code Ann.
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SEVENTH COUNTERCLAIM
[Damages —
42.

Breach of Contract by Timber Products]

The Redd Defendants adopt and reallege paragraphs 1

through 22 of the Counterclaim Factual Allegations as if set forth
in full here.
43.

Timber Products substantially and materially breached the

Agreement

by

failing

to

maintain

the

insurance

required

by

paragraph 8 of the Agreement.
44.

As a result of Timber Products' breach of the Agreement,

the Redd Defendants have incurred at least $3.8 million in damages,
including special damages for the cost incurred in containing and
extinguishing the June 14, 1994 fire, the cost of rehabilitating
the burned area (including re-seeding, planting seedlings, erosion
control, fencing, rebuilding fences, and re-marking timber), the
loss of seed trees, grazing losses, loss of earnings and profits
due to the fire, loss of land value, hunting, and wildlife habitat.
45.

The

foregoing

special

damages

were

known

to Timber

Products to be the probable consequences of a breach at the time it
entered into the Agreement.
EIGHTH COUNTERCLAIM
[Damages —
46.

Breach of Contract by Timber Products]

The Redd Defendants

adopt and reallege paragraphs 1

through 22 of the Counterclaim Factual Allegations as if set forth
in full here.
12

47.

Timber Products substantially and materially breached the

Agreement by failing to indemnify the Redd Defendants for losses
arising from the acts of Applegate and/or Squires, as required by
paragraph 7 of the Agreement,
48.

As a result of Timber Products1 breach of the Agreement,

the Redd Defendants have incurred at least $3.8 million in damages,
including special damages for the cost incurred in containing and
extinguishing the June 14, 1994 fire, the cost of rehabilitating
the burned area (including re-seeding, planting seedlings, erosion
control, fencing, rebuilding fences, and re-marking timber), the
loss of seed trees, grazing losses, loss of earnings and profits
due to the fire, loss of land value, hunting, and wildlife habitat.
49.

The

foregoing

special

damages

were

known

to

Timber

Products to be the probable consequences of a breach at the time it
entered into the Agreement.
NINTH COUNTERCLAIM
[Damages —
50.

Breach of Contract by Timber Products]

The Redd Defendants adopt and reallege paragraphs 1

through 22 of the Counterclaim Factual Allegations as if set forth
in full here.
51.

Timber Products substantially and materially breached the

Agreement by:

13

a.

failing to perform operations in a workmanlike

manner and in accordance with good practices as required
by paragraph 6 of the Agreement;
b.

failing to comply with applicable state and

federal regulations, as required by paragraph 10 of the
Agreement;
c.

failing to take all reasonable precautions to

prevent the origin and spread of fire as required by
paragraph 20 of the Agreement; and
d.

failing

to

pay

the

Redd

Defendants

for

destroyed timber as required by paragraph 21 of the
Agreement.
52.

As a result of Timber Products1 breach of the Agreement,

the Redd Defendants have incurred at least $3.8 million in damages,
including special damages for the cost incurred in containing and
extinguishing the June 14, 1994 fire, the cost of rehabilitating
the burned area (including re-seeding, planting seedlings, erosion
control, fencing, rebuilding fences, and re-marking timber), the
loss of seed trees? grazing losses, loss of earnings and profits
due to the fire, loss of land value, hunting, and wildlife habitat.
53.

The

foregoing

special

damages

were

known

to Timber

Products to be the probable consequences of a breach at the time it
entered into the Agreement.
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TENTH COUNTERCLAIM
[Damages —
54.

Negligence of Timber Products]

The Redd Defendants adopt

and reallege paragraphs 1

through 22 of the Counterclaim Factual Allegations as if set forth
in full here.
55.

On

June

14,

1994, Timber

Products

owed

a

duty

of

reasonable care to the Redd Defendants by virtue of the special
relationship between the parties arising out of the Agreement.
56.

The duty owed to the Redd Defendants by Timber Products

was nondelegable.
57.

Timber Products fell below the standard of reasonable

care by authorizing its subcontractor Applegate to timber on the
Property on June 14, 1994, because the conditions in the forest
created an unreasonable risk of fire for timbering operations.
58.

Timber Products also fell below the reasonable standard

of care by failing to obtain adequate fire insurance coverage for
its timbering operations as contemplated by the Agreement and as
reasonably necessary to protect against the risk of fire of those
operations.
59.

As a direct and proximate result of Timber Products'

negligence in commencing timbering operations on the Property on
June 14, 1994, the Redd Defendants sustained damages including
special

damages

for

the

cost

incurred

in

containing

and

extinguishing the June 14, 1994, fire, the cost of rehabilitating
15

the burned area (including reseeding, planting seedlings, erosion
control, fencing, rebuilding fences, and remarking timber), the
loss of seed trees, grazing losses, loss of earning and profits due
to the fire, loss of land value, hunting, and wildlife habitat.
ELEVENTH COUNTERCLAIM
[Injunctive Relief —
60.

Conversion by Timber Products]

The Redd Defendants adopt and reallege paragraphs 1

through 22 of the Counterclaim Factual Allegations as if set forth
in full here.
61.

Timber

Products

has

threatened

to

resume

timbering

operations on the Property beginning in June, 1995.
62.

If Timber Products resumes such timbering activity in

June, 1995, or thereafter, it will be wrongfully entering upon the
Property, without

authority, and

unlawfully

cutting

down

and

carrying away and converting to its own use timber grown thereon to
the damage of the Redd Defendants.
63.
pursuant

The Redd Defendants therefore seek injunctive relief
to Rule

Applegate, and

65A, U.R.C.P.,

any of

their

to prevent

Timber

employees, servants,

independent

contractors, or agents from entering upon the Property.
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Products,

CROSS CLAIM AGAINST APPLEGATE DEFENDANTS
[Damages —
64.

Negligence of Applegate]

The Redd Defendants

adopt and reallege paragraphs 1

through 22 of the Counterclaim Factual Allegations as if set forth
in full here,
65.
owed

Applegate, including its employee Gary Duane Squires,

a duty of reasonable care to the Redd Defendants

while

conducting timbering operations on the Property.
66.

Applegate knew of the danger created by the hot and dry

weather conditions on the Property on June 14, 1994.
67.

Applegate breached its duty to use reasonable care for

the protection of the Property on June 14, 1994.
68.

Applegatefs actions directly and proximately caused the

forest fire on the Property on June 14, 1994.
69.

As a direct and proximate result of Applegate*s actions,

the Redd Defendants have incurred at least $3.8 million in damages,
including special damages for the cost incurred in containing and
extinguishing the June 14, 1994, fire, the cost of rehabilitating
the burned area (including reseeding, planting seedlings, erosion
control, fencing, rebuilding fences, and remarking timber), the
loss of seed trees, grazing losses, loss of earning and profits due
to the fire, loss of land value, hunting, and wildlife habitat.
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WHEREFORE, the Redd Defendants request that the Court:
A.

Dismiss Timber Products' Complaint.

B.

Enter declaratory judgment against Timber Products and in

favor

of

the

counterclaim
obligations

Redd

Defendants

adjudging

that

on

the

Timber

under the Agreement

Redd

Defendants'

Products

and

that

defaulted

the Redd

first
on

its

Defendants

lawfully terminated the Agreement on February 11, 1995.
C.
favor

of

Enter declaratory judgment against Timber Products and in
the Redd

Defendants

counterclaim

adjudging

substantially

breached

that

on

the Redd

Timber

the Agreement,

Defendants * second

Products

materially

and

thereby

terminating

the

Agreement and entitling the Redd Defendants to damages.
D.
favor

Enter declaratory judgment against Timber Products and in

of

the

counterclaim

Redd

Defendants

adjudging

that

on

the

the

Redd

Redd

Defendants1

Defendants

may

third

lawfully

foreclose on their security interest in the timber that is secured
by the Agreement and the Financing Statements.
E.
favor

of

Enter declaratory judgment against Timber Products and in
the Redd Defendants

counterclaim

adjudging

that

on the Redd
Timber

Defendants'

Products

fourth

repudiated

the

Agreement pursuant to section 70A-2-609, Utah Code Ann., by failing
to provide

adequate

assurance

of

its ability

to perform

its

obligations under the Agreement after receiving the Default Letter.
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F.
favor

of

Enter declaratory judgment against Timber Products and in
the

Redd

Defendants

on

the

Redd

Defendants

fifth

counterclaim adjudging that Timber Products is in default of the
Agreement, thereby entitling the Redd Defendants to take possession
of the collateral

secured by the Agreement

and the Financing

Statements, pursuant to section 70A-9-503, Utah Code Ann.
G.
favor

of

Enter declaratory judgment against Timber Products and in
the

Redd

Defendants

on

the

Redd

Defendants'

sixth

counterclaim adjudging that Timber Products is in default of the
Agreement and that the Redd Defendants have the right to dispose of
the

collateral

secured

by

the

Agreement

and

the

Financing

Statements pursuant to section 70A-9-504, Utah Code Ann.
H.

Enter judgment against Timber Products and in favor of

the Redd Defendants on the Redd Defendants1 seventh counterclaim
awarding damages, including special damages, to be shown at trial.
I.

Enter judgment against Timber Products and in favor of

the Redd Defendants on the Redd Defendants' eighth counterclaim
awarding damages, including special damages, to be shown at trial.
J.

Enter judgment against Timber Products and in favor of

the Redd Defendants on the Redd Defendants' ninth counterclaim
awarding damages, including special damages, to be shown at trial.
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K.

Enter judgment against Timber Products and in favor of

the Redd Defendants on the Redd Defendants1 tenth counterclaim
awarding damages, including special damages, to be awarded at
trial.
L.

Enter judgment against Timber Products and in favor of

the Redd Defendants on the Redd Defendants' eleventh counterclaim
and order injunctive relief prohibiting Timber Products, Applegate,
and any of their employees, servants, independent contractors, or
agents from entering upon the Property without the express consent
of the Redd Defendants.
M.

Enter judgment against Applegate and in favor of the Redd

Defendants on the Redd Defendants1 cross claim awarding damages,
including special damages, to be shown at trial.

the

N.

Enter judgment against Timber Products and in favor of

Redd

Defendants

for the

Redd

Defendants' attorneys'

fees

pursuant to paragraph 26 of the Agreement.
0.

Treble all damages related to the unlawful cutting down,

carrying off, or injuring of trees or timber on the Property
pursuant to section 78-38-3, Utah Code Ann.
P.

Grant

such

other

and

further

relief

as

it

deems

appropriate, including interest, pre-judgment interest, and costs.
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ATTACHMENT B

Ruling on Motion to Intervene and
Ruling on Amended Motion for Order Granting Leave
to File and Serve Third Amended Complaint

Timber Products, Inc. v. Paul David Redd, etal
Civil No. 940700057
(R. 90-95)

DATED this

/?

'/-<

day of June, 1995.
KELLER, JENSEN & BUNNELL
By Michael R. Jensen, #1685
and
HOSKIN, FARINA, ALDRICH & KAMPF
Professional Corporation
By

'^^

^.^A

Gregory K. Hoskin, CO #424
Matthew G. Weber, CO #18615
Post Office Box 40
Grand Junction, Colorado 81502
(970) 242-4903
Attorneys for Defendants:
Paul David Redd; Diane B. Redd;
Paul D, Redd Family Partnership
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SAN JUAN COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

TIMBER PRODUCTS, INC., a
Corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.
PAUL DAVID REDD, et al. ,
Defendants.

SAN JUAN COUNTY,
Plaintiff,
vs
GARY DUANE SQUIRES, et al.,
Defendants.

TIMBER PRODUCTS, INC., a
Corporation,
Third Party Plaintiff,
vs.
UNITED STATES FIDELITY AND
GUARANTY COMPANY, a
Corporation; and THE TALBERT
CORPORATION, a Corporation,

RULING ON MOTION TO
INTERVENE AND RULING ON
AMENDED MOTION FOR ORDER
GRANTING LEAVE TO FILE
AND SERVE THIRD AMENDED
COMPLAINT

JUL

i7v^;

2

Third Party Defendants.

MITCHELL KELLING dba KELLING
INSURANCE AGENCY,
Third Party Plaintiff,
vs .

Civil No. 940700057

TRANSWESTERN GENERAL AGENCY,
INC. ,
Third Party Defendant.

Plaintiff filed a Motion to Intervene and a Motion for Order
Granting Leave to File and Serve Third Amended Complaint to which
the Redd Defendants have no objection.

Defendants Northfield,

USF&G, Kellmg, and the Talbert Corporation filed Memorandums
Opposition.

m

The Court has read the Memorandum, considered the law

and now rules as follows:
The Motions are denied for the reasons that;
1.

The Motions are untimely.

The Court has previously

allowed the Plaintiff to file two Amended Complaints.
was filed in December of 1994.

This lawsuit

Substantial written and deposition

discovery has been completed and it would be prejudicial to add new
parties with new claims and to also allow new claims to be asserted

3

by existing parties to which Defendants would then be entitled to
discovery, resulting in additional delay and expense.
The Court is also not satisfied that the new claims
could not have been brought much earlier in the proceedings.

To

allow them to intervene at this stage of the proceedings would
condone not asserting all claims known much earlier in the action.
2.
the

Court

The cases advanced by Defendant Northfleld persuade

that

the

law

in Utah

is

corporation may not bring a suit m
shareholder
person.

that

a

shareholder

of a

his individual capacity as a

for the wrong done to the corporation by a third

The Stocks' status as a guarantor of corporate debt does

not enhance their status as shareholder and does not establish a
duty which Defendants owed to the Stocks personally.
are

therefore

without

standing

to

bring

the

The Stocks

action

against

Northfleld contemplated by the proposed Third Amended Complaint.
DATED this /f-

day of July, 1997.

\<LSJ62-

BRYCE K T BRYNER
District Court Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the \0

day of July, 1997, a true

and correct copy of the foregoing RULING ON MOTION TO INTERVENE AND
RULING ON AMENDED MOTION FOR ORDER GRANTING LEAVE TO FILE AND SERVE
THIRD

AMENDED

COMPLAINT

was

mailed,

following:

Michael R. Jensen
Attorney at Law
JENSEN & BUNNELL
90 West 100 North
Price, Utah 84501
Gregory K. Hoskin
Matthew G. Weber
Attorneys at Law
HOSKIN, FARINA, ALDRICH & KAMPF
Professional Corporation
Post Office Box 40
Grand Junction, Colorado 81502
Ray G. Martineau
Attorney at Law
3 098 Highland Drive, Suite 450
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
Gary L. Johnson
Attorney at Law
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON
50 South Main, 7th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144

postage

prepaid,

to

the
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Michael L. Deamer
Attorney at Law
RANDLE, DEAMER, ZARR & LEE, P.C.
139 East South Temple, Suite 330
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
S. Baird Morgan
Attorney at Law
STRONG Sc HANNI
9 Exchange Place, Suite 600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Dale J. Lambert
Attorney at Law
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C.
175 South West Temple, Suite 510
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1410
Ford G. Sculley
Attorney at Law
261 East 300 South, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Daniel Anderson
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 275
Monticello, Utah

84535

Craig C. Halls
San Juan County Attorney
P.O. Box 850
Monticello, Utah 84535
David S. Cook
85 West 400 Nortn
Bountiful, Utah 84010

6

Gary Duane Squires
P.O. Box 622
Naturita, Colorado

81422

^y^->

In compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act,
individuals n: . 3 special accommocaiions (including
commuraca-.
< and services) our-m; 'ne oroceeanr.
should call 1-8OO-W2-0172. at least THREE wortan;;

ATTACHMENT C

Ruling on USF&G's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment

Timber Products, Inc. v. Paul David Redd, etal
Civil No. 940700057
(Decided February 18, 1999)

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SAN JUAN COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
TIMBER PRODUCTS, INC., a
Corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.
PAUL DAVID REDD, et al. ,
Defendants.
SAN JUAN COUNTY,
Plaintiff,
vs.
GARY DUANE SQUIRES, et al. ,
Defendants.
TIMBER PRODUCTS, INC., a
Corporation,
Third Party Plaintiff,
vs.
UNITED STATES FIDELITY AND
GUARANTY COMPANY, a
Corporation; and THE TALBERT
CORPORATION, a Corporation,
Third Party Defendants.

RULING ON USF&G'S MOTION FOR
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

2

MITCHELL KELLING dba KELLING
INSURANCE AGENCY,
Third Party Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No. 940700057

TRANSWESTERN GENERAL AGENCY,
INC.,
Third Party Defendant.
Defendant USF&G's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment seeks a
ruling that Endorsement CG 22 54 to the General Liability Policy is
unambiguous and enforceable and therefore excludes coverage for
property damage due to the fire that occurred in June of 1994. TPI
responds

by

claiming

that

CG

22

54

is ambiguous,

should

be

construed against USF&G, and that the endorsement is unenforceable.
Under Utah law, whether contractual language is ambiguous is
a question of law for the court to decide.

The court finds that

the exclusionary language contained in CG 22 54 is not reasonably
susceptible to more than one interpretation.
or more plausible meanings.

It does not have two

The exclusion eliminates coverage for

property damage of any type caused by fire, but then goes on to
broadly exclude any property damage to any vehicle while being
loaded or unloaded, however caused.
Because there is no ambiguity, no presumption arises in favor
of TPI and the policy language should be construed according to its
usual and ordinary meaning.

An examination of the policy language

of CG 22 54 reveals that it clearly excludes from coverage property

3

damage due to fire.

No other interpretation can be ascribed to it

as there is no other plausible meaning.
The

court

interpretation

also
of

finds

that

insurance

under

the

contracts,

CG

general
22

54

rules

of

operates

independently against the general declaration of insurance found in
the

policy.

The

general

grants

of

coverage

found

on

the

declaration page and the contractual liability language do not
serve to revive coverage.
The court therefore finds that Endorsement CG 22 54 bars
coverage for the property damage claims against USF&G, and it
follows that USF&G has no duty to defend TPI with respect to those
claims.
Counsel for Defendant USF&G is directed to prepare a Partial
Summary Judgment consistent with this ruling.
DATED this / X

day of February, 1999.

District Court Judg
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the

day of February, 1999, a

true and correct copy of the foregoing RULING ON USF&G'S MOTION FOR
PARTIAL

SUMMARY

JUDGMENT was mailed,

following:
Michael R. Jensen
Attorney at Law
90 West 100 North
Price, Utah 84501
Gregory K. Hoskin
Matthew G. Weber
Attorneys at Law
P.O. Box 4 0
Grand Junction, Colorado

81502

Ray G. Martineau
Attorney at Law
3098 Highland Drive, Suite 450
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
Gary L. Johnson
Attorney at Law
50 South Main, 7th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
Michael L. Deamer
Attorney at Law
139 East South Temple, Suite 330
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Roger Bullock
Attorney at Law
9 Exchange Place, Suite 600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Dale J. Lambert
Attorney at Law
175 South West Temple, Suite 510
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1410

postage prepaid,

to the

